In my studies of Heidegger recently the idea was presented to me that there might possibly be some correlation between Martin Heidegger's notion of authenticity as presented in Being and Time and Martin Luther's notion of salvation. In researching this several similarities have become apparent to me as well as several differences. I shall point these out as I discuss their respective views on one's original condition, what one can do in one's life, one's death, and finally some major points concerning their general positions. First, however, I would like to point out what appears to be an immediate fundamental difference between Heidegger and Luther that will actually disappear as the comparison continues. This difference concerns each one's opinion on free will.
In Being and Time Heidegger never directly addresses the issue of free will; however, his terminology regarding authenticity always speaks in terms of one's making a choice. When addressing his concept of anticipation of death and authenticity he makes this clear:
When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death,one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose..(Heidegger 264).
Understanding then that at least in Being and Time Heidegger spoke in terms of a will that is free to choose, an apparent contrast to Luther becomes apparent as Luther was outspokenly opposed to the possibility of human free will. Writing in response to a work defending free will by Erasmus, Luther writes, " free will is a downright lie" (Winter 98). Writing further he goes on to defend this position based on his view that God has complete foreknowledge not contingent upon our choices:
.. it is not in the power .. of any creature to alter it, or change his will from that which God had foreseen.. If God be not deceived in that which he foreknows, then that which He foreknows must of necessity come to pass (Winter 131).
This very striking difference does not appear again, however, if one turns to other works by Luther. In The Small Catechism Luther writes to fellow pastors concerning their congregations, " If any refuse to receive your instruction, tell them that they deny Christ and are no Christians" (Lull 472). This is in complete contradiction to his writings refuting free will where free will is defined as "the ability of the human will whereby man can turn toward or turn away from that which leads into eternal salvation" (Winter 119). If this free will is not a thing possessed by humans, then certainly no human can turn away from or deny Christ as he stated above in The Small Catechism.
Again in a treatise entitled The Freedom of a Christian, Luther speaks as if man did possess some form of free will as he states, " A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none" (Lull 596). He goes on to speak further concerning "the righteousness and the freedom of the soul" (Lull 597). With this in mind it seems apparent that at least in his works to other Christians concerning Christian life and salvation Luther speaks in terms of free will. Thus as the former are the principal subject matters concerning Luther that this paper shall focus on, the issue of free will shall be left.
Now in beginning to compare Heidegger and Luther it seems quite natural to begin with the beginning of life, or in other words the original condition of man. For Heidegger this condition comes out in his concept of throwness. He defines this concept as "the facticity of its (Dasein) being delivered over" (Heidegger 135). At this point the question immediately emerges as to what Dasein is delivered over. Heidegger answers this question and explains in greater detail the idea that thrownness is an essential characteristic of Dasein:
Thrownness is neither a `fact that is finished' nor a Fact that is settled. Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw and is sucked into the turbulence of the `they's' inauthenticity (Heidegger 179).
With this Heidegger has introduced two new concepts in the `they' which shall be treated at present and authentic and inauthentic life which shall be saved until later. Heidegger attempts to elucidate the `they' in terms of other Dasein:
But this distantiallity which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others to dispose of as they please (Heidegger 126).
Thus to be in the throw of the `they' is one's given and everyday condition of simply choosing and acting as the Others would.
These Others for Heidegger, however, are not specific:
These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with (Heidegger 126).
In more contemporary terms this might be to simply choose and act because that is simply how one chooses and acts. One can think of the `they' as perhaps community, culture, or any other human institution which has no exact person or people to identify with it.
This concept of Dasein's original condition as Being one of throwness to the `they' brings us to Luther's similar concept of man's original sin. For Luther man's original condition is one of being a sinner. In The Small Catechism Luther writes of "the old Adam in us, together with all sins and evil lusts" (Lull 485). He continues with a greater explication of this matter in The Smalcald Articles:
Here we must confess what St. Paul said in Rom. 5:12, namely, that sin had its origin in one man, Adam, through whose disobedience all men were made sinners and became subject to death and the devil. This is called original sin, or the root sin (Lull 516).
The natural question now is what can man or Dasein do about these original conditions. For Heidegger the answer to this question lies in his distinction between authentic and in authentic choice. As mentioned above the inauthentic choice is the thrown which is captured in the `they'. What then is the authentic choice? Heidegger first mentions the possibility of being authentic as he describes the possibility of Dasein choosing for itself:
And because Dasein is in each case its essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, `choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself...but only in so far as it is something essentially which can be authentic-that is something of its own (Heidegger 42).
This losing itself, which Heidegger usually refers to as falling into the `they', has already been explicated in the throwness of Dasein into the `they'. The possibility of this being thrown which is the original condition of Dasein is then founded in the possibility of Dasein being authentic. What then is this being authentic or something of one's own? Heidegger suggests that the first step in being authentic is to realize one's throwness and to understand the tradition of interpreting the world which has been presented by the `they':
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self- that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the `they', and must first find itself (Heidegger 129).
Once Dasein has realized this `they-self' which makes itself manifest in Dasein's everyday choices, Dasein is then ready according to Heidegger to make authentic choices if it accepts this throwness as its disclosed motivation:
Proximally Dasein is `they', and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the `world' and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bar its own way (Heidegger 129).
A good example of this type of authentic choice would be if somebody realized he has always enjoyed a certain food because it was what he had always had and it was what everybody else had eaten as well. That person then could choose to eat this food authentically as long as he remembered why he liked this food.
With this explanation of authentic choices, there do not appear at this point to be any choices which must be made in order for one to have made an authentic choice. As shall be pointed out later, however, this position changes for Heidegger as he begins to give examples of authentic choices, but this shall be saved until after a discussion of Luther's concept of salvation.
In order to understand Luther's concept of salvation one must remember that, just as for Heidegger Dasein is thrown, for Luther man is born into original sin. Just then as Dasein must understand its throwness in order to make authentic choices, man must understand his original sin for Luther in order to achieve salvation. Speaking of what one would say as a saved and redeemed soul, Luther says:
I believe that Jesus Christ ... has redeemed me, a lost and condemned creature, delivered me and freed me from all sins, from death, and from the power of the devil..(Lull 480).
Thus, in order to have salvation, knowledge of one's original lost and condemned state must be implicit. Luther continues in saying that the main purpose of God's law is to create in the sinner an awareness of the need for salvation:
Here we maintain that the law was given by God first of all to restrain sins by threats and fear of punishment and by the promise and the offer of grace and favor. But this purpose failed because of the wickedness which sin has worked in man... however, the chief function or power of the law is to make original sin manifest and show man to what utter depths his nature has fallen and how corrupt it has become (Lull 517).
Now it remains to show how one achieves salvation beyond this recognizing of one's original damnation. For Luther this is simply a matter of faith in God's grace. Speaking again of how one should state the conditions for salvation, Luther says:
I believe ... the Holy Spirit has called me through the Gospel, enlightened me with his gifts, and sanctified and preserved me in true faith (Lull 480).
Thus for Luther salvation is a matter of grace of God in the form of the calling of the Holy Spirit and true faith in this grace by the Christian. He writes elsewhere clarifying that there is nothing besides this faith in God's grace which one can do to attain salvation: ... the righteousness of faith comes by grace, without the law. This saying, `without the law' can mean nothing else, but that Christian righteousness exists without the works of the law; the works of the law availing and effecting nothing toward its attainment (Winter 134).
This now seems very similar to the Heideggerian notion of authenticity. In order to be saved or authentic one must realize one's original condition of being either in original sin or in the thrownness of the they-self. Also another similarity appears to emerge at this point in that neither seem as of yet to have any specific works or choices in mind, beyond having faith and disclosing one's throwness, that must be done in order to achieve salvation or authenticity. This, however, soon changes.
Luther, while saying that no work or works can help one attain salvation, does, however, claim that one cannot be saved without as a consequence deciding to perform certain works. As Luther states in The Small Catechism, one who is saved should then obey the Word of God and keeps its commandments:
He promises grace and every blessing to all who keep them. We should therefore love him, trust in him, and cheerfully do what he has commanded (Lull 479).
This would seem to be in contradiction with Luther's idea that works cannot attain salvation since it seems to suggest God must grant one grace if one keeps and obeys his Word; however, quite the opposite is true since, as was noted earlier, man is condemned before God's grace is granted and thus cannot keep the commandments. As Luther writes:
The heavenly Father gives us his Holy Spirit so that by his grace we may believe in his Holy Word and live a godly life, both here in time and hereafter forever (Lull 482).
Thus Luther stresses the importance of grace in order to keep the Word of God as well as faith that in keeping the Word of God one receives God's grace and salvation.
To clear this matter up further, Luther goes on to describe what he sees as the two components of the Word of God:
I call both the law and the gospel the `words of God'. The law requires works, the gospel faith. There is nothing else that leads to the grace of God, or unto eternal salvation, but the word and the work of God, because grace, or the Spirit is the very life which the words and the work of God lead us (Winter 121).
Thus Luther would have one have faith in the gospel of God in order that one may obey the law of God, bearing in mind that it is grace which makes either of these possible:
Good works follow such faith... Whatever is still sinful or imperfect in these works will not be reckoned as sin or defect for the sake of .. Christ. The whole man, in respect both of his person and of his works, shall be accounted and shall be righteous and holy through the pure grace and mercy which have been poured out upon us so abundantly in Christ (Lull 534).
Luther goes on to describe in detail parts of the law of God which must be kept if one has received grace. The first of these is the obeying of the ten commandments:
God threatens to punish all who transgress these commandments. We should therefore fear his wrath and not disobey these commandments (Lull 479).
This then, that God punishes, is part of faith in the gospel for Luther which then leads to the obeying of the commandments.
Luther goes on in The Small Catechism to describe several other aspects of the law which must also be kept. Two of these, however, take on special prominence. The first is baptism of which he says, " Baptism is nothing else than the Word of God in water, commanded by the institution of Christ" (Lull 527). This Word of God in water as a command has very significant effects:
It effects forgiveness of sins, delivers from death and the devil, and grants eternal salvation to all who believe, as the Word and the promise of God declare (Lull 484).
Baptism is then a command which must be kept if one has faith in the gospel and its promise.
The second of these is the sacrament of the alter. Luther placed great importance on this sacrament saying:
He who does not highly esteem the sacrament suggests thereby that he has no sin, no flesh, no devil, no world, no death, no hell. That is to say, he believes in none of these, although he is deeply immersed in them and is held captive by the devil. On the other hand, he suggests that he needs no grace, no life, no paradise, no heaven, no Christ, no God, nothing good at all (Lull 475).
He goes on to say that it is not possible to refuse the sacrament and have salvation:
... anyone who does not desire to receive the sacrament at least three or four times a year despises the sacrament and is no Christian, just as he is no Christian who does not hear and believe the Gospel...(Lull 474).
Thus this sacrament is also of vital importance and will be kept by anyone who in faith has been granted salvation.
Similarly as Heidegger turns his attention to some specific examples of authentic choices, one finds that he does in fact have in mind that in some cases one is bound to choose in a certain way in order to be authentic. One of these is his example of how one can authentically have resoluteness. Heidegger's first defines resoluteness as " the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one's-Self" (Heidegger 270). He later goes on to explain resoluteness further:
This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience- this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety- we call `resoluteness' (Heidegger 343).
To understand then what is involved in being authentically resolute one must also turn to Heidegger's notion of Being-guilty and anxiety. Beginning with Being-guilty, Heidegger states:
Being-guilty constitutes the Being to which we give the name `care'. In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this entity face to face with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger 286).
This uncanniness comes from one's being in anxiety as Heidegger states that "in anxiety one feels uncanny" (Heidegger 188).
This anxiety is for Heidegger the basic state-of-mind which enables Dasein to become free of the `they':
Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about- its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world... Therefore..anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization (Heidegger 187).
Thus in order to separate oneself from the `they' in order to choose authentically Dasein must be in the state-of-mind characterized by anxiety. This in turn allows for the possibility of Being-guilty and resoluteness which are the accepting for Dasein's own the tradition, good or bad, of the `they'.
With this as an example of what is entailed in one authentic choice, one can now turn to Heidegger's notion of an authentic view of time. Heidegger states that the more primordial experience of time is " the unity of the ecstases ... the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present" (Heidegger 329). This is contrary to the everyday understanding of Dasein's they-self of time as a sequence of nows:
What is characteristic of the `time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of `nows', without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. But this very levelling off, in accordance with its existential meaning, is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporalizing, in conformity with which temporality temporalizes as inauthentic the kind of time which we have just mentioned (Heidegger 329).
With this characterization of the they-self's understanding of time as inauthentic it becomes apparent that in some cases it is not enough to simply recognize the `they's' understanding and accept that this is where one's understanding came from in order to be authentic. To the contrary, in the case of viewing time, the authentic view is what Heidegger called the primordial view and is completely different than the view of time held by the `they'. This reliance upon the primordial view as the authentic view is probably most evident in Heidegger's view of death.
Heidegger describes the authentic view of death as of death as "that possibility that is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped" (Heidegger 250) where this possibility is "the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there" (Heidegger 250). It is this possibility of the ending of all possibilities which Heidegger says is the more primordial and hence authentic as opposed to the they-self conception of death. Heidegger characterizes this conception as one which covers up the authentic view of death:
In Dasein's public way of interpreting, it is said that `one dies', because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that `in no case is it I myself', for this `one' is the `nobody'. `Dying' is levelled off...Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that noone can be my representative, is perverted into an event of public occurrence which the `they' encounters (Heidegger 253).
Heidegger's conception of an authentic view of death brings one to another major point of comparison. This point concerns the importance of a proper view of death for both Heidegger and Luther. In each case death, and the consequences of the proper view of it, provides one with the ability for both authentic choice and salvation.
In Heidegger's case Dasein, in just simply existing, is characterized as having "already been thrown into this possibility" (Heidegger 251) which is the possibility of death in the authentic description of it. Thus Dasein is always aware of the authentic understanding of death even when it covers it up with the `they' understanding:
... death is something distinctively impending. It existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially closed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself. This item in the structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death (Heidegger 251).
In this constant impending Dasein, if he views death authentically, understands that the end of all possibilities may come at any moment: Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. `As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die' (Heidegger 245).
It is this authentic understanding of oneself as Being-towards-death which helps one to be able to start making authentic choices. This is revealed in Heidegger's understanding of anxiety in the face of death:
Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state-of-mind which we have called `anxiety'. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety in the face of' that potentiality-for-Being which is one's ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped. That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself. That about which one has this anxiety is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger 251).
This anxiety as was noted before is what individualizes Dasein. Thus authentic Being-towards death has the state-of-mind of anxiety which is what separates Dasein from its they-self and allows authentic choice.
Similarly a proper understanding of death plays a crucial role in Luther's concept of salvation. As Luther states in A Sermon on Preparing to Die, it is in understanding that he will die that man realizes his need for salvation in this life:
Since everyone must depart, we must turn our eyes to God, to whom the path of death leads and directs us. Here we find the beginning of the narrow gate and of the straight path to life (Lull 638).
It is also Luther's understanding of death, however, which contains one of the leading contrasts to Heidegger's thought. As was pointed out earlier, for Heidegger the authentic view of death is the realization that death is the possibility of the end of all possibilities which may come at any time. Obviously Luther would not hold that death is the end of all possibilities since as was discussed above Luther believed death simply leads the Christian to God and the rest to eternal damnation. Luther would also not hold with Heidegger's notion that death is something of which one should be constantly aware:
Death looms so large and is terrifying because our foolish and fainthearted nature has etched its image too vividly within itself and constantly fixes its gaze on it. Moreover, the devil presses man to look closely at the gruesome mien and image of death to add to his worry, timidity, and despair. Indeed, he conjures up before man's eyes all the kinds of sudden and terrible death ever seen, heard, or read by man (Lull 640).
It is his attributing this worry over the possibility of a sudden death to the devil that puts Luther's view of death in stark contrast to Heidegger's authentic one.
At this point in the discussion it is now time to compare some other important differences between Heidegger and Luther. The first of these is the normative difference between Heidegger's conception of authenticity and Luther's conception of salvation. One is tempted because of Heidegger's choice of terminology to ascribe normative value to authenticity. This is, however, simply not the case:
As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any `less' Being or any `lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity (Heidegger 43).
Considered in this way, authenticity and inauthenticity remain simply two different modes of Being of Dasein and there does not emerge any reason for choosing to be authentic.
This is simply not the same as Luther's view of salvation. Luther speaks of man as either damned or saved. These terms carry obvious normative value which Luther never seeks to eliminate. In fact, Luther always writes to his fellow Christians as to what they ought to be doing as has been shown before in his remarks concerning how a Christian ought to take part in the sacrament of the alter, to be baptized, and to obey the ten commandments. These things a Christian should do since otherwise he is no Christian and must fear God's punishment of eternal damnation.
A second discrepancy concerns the duration of authenticity as opposed to salvation. In being authentic Dasein is choosing to act in a certain way because it has disclosed to itself its primordial understanding of the situation. In so doing Dasein is simply choosing for that moment and thus authenticity is momentary:
When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically `there' in the `moment of vision' as regards the Situation which has been disclosed (Heidegger 328).
Thus authenticity is quite opposed to salvation since for Luther one either has received God's grace for the duration of eternity or he has not. This becomes apparent as Luther says that for a Christian to give in to doubts concerning his eternal salvation is for him to give into being worried by the devil:
When man is being assailed by thoughts regarding his election, he is being assailed by hell, as the psalms lament so much. He who surmounts this temptation has vanquished sin, hell, and death all in one (Lull 642). A third discrepancy lies in the difference between who is acting in authenticity and salvation. As has been said before, an authentic choice for Heidegger is one that is made as an individual separated from the `they'. This is not true, however, in salvation. Instead Luther refers to the Christian as a mere tool of God:
Christians ... are driven by the Spirit of God. To be driven is not to act or do oneself. But we are so seized as a saw or an ax is handled by a carpenter (Winter 127).
Thus, just as for Heidegger in inauthenticity Dasein is the they-self, for Luther man in salvation is appealing to God in order to choose and act.
Now there is but one final point to discuss. Luther has often been quoted as saying that belief in salvation by the grace of God is a matter of faith, but of what is the belief in authenticity to be founded? Theodor Adorno discusses this in The Jargon of Authenticity. Here Adorno claims that Heidegger's notion of authenticity, once set forth in philosophy to the point that the term `authentic' becomes a term in phenomenological jargon, is used by the `they' to actually prevent individualization:
Heidegger instituted authenticity against the they ... But he did not foresee that what he named authentic, once become word, would grow toward the same exchange-society anonymity against which Being and Time rebelled... that jargon calms the constantly festering suspicion of uprootedness (Adorno 18).
This `uprootedness' or uncanny, not-at-home feeling is found for Heidegger in anxiety which is the very state-of-mind which individualizes Dasein from the `they' allowing the possibility of authentic choice. In this manner then, according to Adorno, there lies the very real possibility that the concept of authenticity is just another device of the `they'. Perhaps then the greatest similarity between Heidegger and Luther is that, just as with salvation for Luther, Dasein must simply take the possibility of authentic choice as a matter of faith.
Bibliography:
Luther, Martin, Winter, Ernst ed. (1984). Discourse on Free Will. New
York : Frederick Ungar Publishing
Luther, Martin, Lull, Timothy ed. (1989). Martin Luther's Basic
Theological Writings. Minneapolis, MN : Augsburg Fortress
Adorno, Theodor. (1973). The Jargon of Authenticity. Chicago, IL:
Northwestern University Press
Heidegger, Martin. (1962). Being and Time. San Francisco, CA :
Harper and Rowe
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